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Abstract
Hierarchical structures are ubiquitous in human and animal societies, but a fundamental understanding of their raison d’eˆtre has been
lacking. Here, we present a general theory in which hierarchies are obtained as the optimal design that strikes a balance between
the benefits of group productivity and the costs of communication for coordination. By maximising a generic representation of the
output of a hierarchical organization with respect to its design, the optimal configuration of group sizes at different levels can be
determined. With very few ingredients, a wide variety of hierarchically ordered complex organisational structures can be derived.
Furthermore, our results rationalise the ubiquitous occurrence of triadic hierarchies, i.e., of the universal preferred scaling ratio
between 3 and 4 found in many human and animal hierarchies, which should occur according to our theory when production is
rather evenly contributed by all levels. We also provide a systematic approach for optimising team organisation, helping to address
the question of the optimal ‘span of control’. The significantly larger number ∼ 3 − 20 of subordinates a supervisor typically
manages is rationalised to occur in organisations where the production is essentially done at the bottom level and in which the
higher levels are only present to optimise coordination and control.
Keywords: hierarchical structure, span of control, complex systems
Throughout most of Homo sapiens 300’000 year record,
humans have lived in small-scale, mostly egalitarian hunter-
gatherer societies, comprising around 30-50 or, at most, a few
hundred individuals [1–3]. Following the strong warming of
Earth by 5 to 10 ◦C from about 15’000 years ago leading to
the end of the last ice age, settled communities emerged around
10’000 years ago, together with agriculture and animal domes-
tication. These societies have been mostly structured into hier-
archical societies. Over the past millennia, even more complex,
large scale interconnected societies have evolved, shaped into
cultural, economic, political and corporate hierarchies [3, 4].
Explanations for the benefits of hierarchical organisation are
manifold, such as advantages in warfare and multilevel selec-
tion [3, 5], optimal search properties [6], robustness [7], effec-
tive use of resources [3] and so on. But a framework to quantita-
tively relate the specific hierarchical structures to the functions
and constraints facing different types of society has been lack-
ing.
Here, we determine the optimal social hierarchical configu-
ration by maximising the output of an organization with respect
to its design. Our framework accounts for the finite Dunbar’s
number as well as the universal preferred scaling ratio between
3 and 4 found in many human and animal hierarchies [8–11].
This model provides the first quantitative explanation for the
ubiquitous occurrence of such triadic hierarchies, and further-
more provides a framework to answer questions regarding op-
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timal team sizes in management tasks, helping to address the
question of the optimal span of control [12–14].
1. Ingredients of a reduced-form theory of organisation
structure
1.1. Production scaling and costs of coordination as a function
of group size
We consider N individuals, who are working together to pro-
duce some output. This can be a directly measurable product
or quantity, such as the revenue of a firm, or a more abstract
quantity, e.g. overall group fitness. Quite generally, we may
assume that the joint production Π, resulting from the interac-
tion of N individuals, scales as Π ∼ Nβ (β > 0). The most
straightforward situation corresponds to β = 1, i.e. global out-
put is proportional to population. However, for small groups,
one could expect that “the whole is more than the sum of its
parts”, and indeed, it has been shown that the aggregate output
in open-software projects scales super-linearly with the number
of developers (β > 1), at least for group sizes N less than 30 to
50 persons [15]. Intuitively, this means that a group of individ-
uals together can produce more than the sum of their individual
production in absence of interaction. Generally, specialisation
and complementary skills motivate cooperation between indi-
viduals to achieve results that would otherwise be impossible.
Increased productivity can result from information sharing [16]
as well as group heterogeneity [15], among others.
But as the group size increases, this super-linear production
may tip over to just linear (β = 1) or even sub-linear growth
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(β < 1) [17, 18], because the human brain can only cope with
a limited number of social interactions [19] and too many com-
munication channels would overload the attention span leading
to collapsing performance. Generally, the overhead associated
with communication, coordination and management of a group
of collaborators of size N tends to decrease the performance per
individual, a well-known characteristic of large organisations.
As a first step, this cost can be represented as being propor-
tional to the number N(N − 1)/2 ∼ N2 of pair-wise interactions
between the N individuals in the group.
1.2. Optimal group size and Dunbar’s number
Starting from the production scaling law Π ∼ Nβ supposed to
hold for small teams, and adding communication costs as being
approximately proportional to N(N − 1)/2 ∼ N2, we obtain
Π = µNβ − λN2, (1)
where µ and λ are two positive constants, which we refer to as
the productivity factor and the coordination cost factor, respec-
tively. Production now exhibits a maximum at
N∗ = (µβ/2λ)1/(2−β) (2)
individuals (as long as β < 2, which is a realistic assumption
[15]). Thus, rather than a production scaling with the group size
N, expression (1) predicts that, due to the cost of communica-
tion and coordination, groups of sizes larger than N∗ persons
produce less than smaller groups of size N∗. Large scale so-
cieties would then collapse into independent groups of size N∗.
While this is obviously counterfactual when interpreted for pro-
duction, this prediction provides a rational for Dunbar’s num-
ber [20], which is the maximum number of people with whom
one can and does maintain stable social relationships. Dunbar’s
number is typically between 100 and 250, with a commonly
used typical value of 150. This finite number has been sug-
gested to result from cognitive constraints on group size that
depends on the volume of neural material available for process-
ing and synthesizing information on social relationships. This
‘social brain hypothesis’ describes the coevolution of neocorti-
cal brain size and social group sizes. In this context, the first
term ∼ Nβ captures the need for humans to cooperate and to
socialise. The second term ∼ N2 embodies the costs of enforc-
ing the restrictive rules and norms to maintain a stable, cohesive
group. Using β ≈ 1.5 [15] in (2) yields µ/λ ≈ 16 for humans.
Within this simple framework, the smaller group sizes of mon-
keys and primates may be interpreted as due to a smaller pro-
ductivity factor and/or a larger coordination cost factor. Evo-
lutionary improvement of the productivity factor by a factor of
two predicts a four-fold increase of the optimal group size (for
a fixed β = 1.5), possibly explaining how moderate cognitive
increase may be associated with much larger group sizes. Tech-
nology, in the form of digital networking and artificial intelli-
gence for instance, might promote an increase in the produc-
tivity factor, which could then be associated with larger social
group sizes in futuristic human-digital symbiotic societies.
1.3. Evidence and needs for sub-group formation
Returning to the description of large firms and countries,
their overall outputs typically increase approximately in pro-
portion to the number of employees or citizens (allowing to de-
fine for instance such important economic metric as the GDP
per capita). What is missing in the naive model (1) is that, in
a group of N individuals, not everybody is directly interacting
with everybody else. Instead, sub-groups form, with closely
knitted individuals within a given sub-group interacting with
other sub-groups via their representatives. A vivid illustration is
provided by the organisation of combattants in an army, where
soldiers at the bottom level form squads of about 10 headed by
a corporal, then 3-4 squads form a platoon, 3 platoons combine
into a company and so on. Such an organisation ensures an effi-
cient transmission of information top-down and bottom-up for
optimal battlefield performance. Such tendency to arrange into
hierarchically structured groups have been reported widely, as
previously mentioned [3, 8, 21].
To develop an intuition how this can come about, let us con-
sider again N agents who need to communicate and coordi-
nate. Under a flat organisation in which everyone interacts
with everyone, the total coordination cost would be C ∼ N2.
But dividing the population into N1 groups of N0 individuals
each (N = N0 · N1), the total communication overhead C then
scales as N20 · N1 + N21 , where the first term accounts for the
intra-communication cost of N1 groups of size N0, and the sec-
ond term accounts for the inter-communication between the N1
groups through a single channel (for instance one representative
of each group). C is minimized for N0 ∼ N1/3,N1 ∼ N2/3 for
which C ∼ N4/3. The introduction of an additional level struc-
ture above the individual one thus reduces the communication
overhead very significantly from C ∼ N2 to N4/3. In the sup-
plementary information (SI), building on [22], we show that the
addition of more layers (groups of groups, and so on) asymptot-
ically reduces the cost to C ∼ N (and some logarithmic correc-
tion terms). This reduced communication cost in hierarchical
organizations helps understand how states and companies can
function even when N is of the order of millions.
However, the argument that hierarchical structures are cre-
ated just to solve the coordination problem [22] cannot be the
whole story, because social agents come together in the first
place to gain something, such as mutual protection, increased
outputs, and so on. Here, we extend expression (1) to general
hierarchical organisation structures and derive the optimal de-
signs to maximise production.
2. Parameterisation and formulation of the optimisation
problem
2.1. General formulation
Following [22], we consider N individuals organised into p
hierarchical levels. We denote by N0 the number of individ-
uals per group at the bottom of the hierarchical structure, i.e.
the number of individuals per ‘base group’. At the next higher
order in the hierarchical chain, q1 = N1/N0 base groups taken
2
  
individuals
base group
1. super-group
2. super-group
Figure 1: Illustration of the hierarchical organization. We show the case with
p = 2, i.e. 3 hierarchical levels (without counting the individual level). We start
from N = 18 individuals. The base groups are of size 3 (N0 = q0 = 3), i.e. three
individuals together form one group. The next groups (the first super-groups)
are of size 2 (q1 = 2,N1 = q1 · q0 = 6), i.e. two base-groups together form one
higher order group. The second super-group (and also the top level) is again of
size 3 (q2 = 3,N2 = q0 · q1 · q2 = N = 18).
together form a supergroup of N1 individuals. Iterating, we de-
fine qr as the hierarchical group ratio, i.e. the size of a group at
level r compared to level r − 1,
qr ≡ NrNr−1 =
number of groups of size Nr−1 that
form a supergroup of Nr individuals,
(3)
with q0 ≡ N0, and deduce iteratively Nr = q0 ·q1 ·. . .·qr Through
qp = Np/Np−1 and Np ≡ N, we arrive finally at the highest level
of the hierarchy.
Fig. 1 illustrates this construction. Note in particular that be-
cause Np = N is the number of individuals at the highest level
of the hierarchy, we have a total of p + 1 hierarchical levels
(we do not count the individual level). The special case of ab-
sence of hierarchies, i.e. p = 0, q0 = N0 = N, represents a
system with only one level where everyone interacts with ev-
eryone. Identifying N−1 ≡ 1 allows us to treat this case con-
sistently. Also, note that qr > 2 (groups consist of at least two
members). The maximum number of hierarchical levels is then
pmax = blog2 Nc − 1 (where bxc denotes the integer part of x),
with the constant −1 ensuring that counting starts from p = 0.
The hierarchical generalization of expression (1) to p + 1 hi-
erarchical levels amounts to summing over the productions Πr
of each level r as follows:
Π(p) =
p∑
r=0
Πr =
p∑
r=0
(
µrq
β
r − λrqr(qr − 1)
)
× N∏r
i=0 qi
(4)
where the first factor under the sum in the r.h.s. of (4) denotes
the production of a group at level r and the second factor repre-
sents the number of groups at that level.
2.2. Geometric hierarchies
The productivity factors µr and coordination cost factors λr
can depend on level r. It is natural to consider a geometric
hierarchy defined with
µr = ω κ
r, λr = ρ
r , (5)
for some positive numbers ω, κ, ρ. The geometric series for µr
and λr with constant scaling factors κ and ρ give a parsimonious
dependence on the level r: for κ > 1 (resp. < 1), higher lev-
els of the hierarchy are more (resp. less) productive; for ρ > 1
(resp. < 1), higher levels of the hierarchy require more (resp.
less) efforts for coordination. The special case κ = 1 (resp.
ρ = 1) corresponds to the same productivity (resp. communica-
tion cost) at all levels. The additional coefficient ω in µr is the
production of a single individual, which also sets the relative
strength of productivity versus communication cost.
Putting (5) into (4), factoring out κr and defining the relative
cost-productivity scaling factor η ≡ ρ/κ gives
Π(p) =
p∑
r=0
κr
(
ω qβr − ηr qr(qr − 1)
)
× N∏r
i=0 qi
. (6)
which constitutes our main object of study. Given a population
of N individuals, for a given set of parameters κ, ω, η and β, our
goal is to determine the optimal hierarchical structure, charac-
terised by its number of hierarchical levels p∗ and the associated
group sizes {q0, . . . , qp∗ }, which maximise the production (6).
2.3. Military hierarchies
Instead of (5), it also instructive to study the special case
µr = ωδr0 while keeping λr = ρr. This represents the situation
where only the ground level produces actual output, whereas
the higher order levels are only acting as coordination nodes,
for instance to allocate resources, manage and control. We shall
refer to this as the military hierarchy, in reference to the fact that
it is often the lowest military ranks (starting with “privates”)
who are exposed to active combats (new technology may be
changing this), and the higher levels mostly exert “command
and control”.
This case with the approximation q(q− 1) ≈ q2 allows for an
analytical treatment given in the SI. As an illustration, with N =
212 = 4096, β = 1.5, ρ = 0.5, ω = 6, the optimal production is
Π = 40′447 with p∗ = 4 and the optimal structure is given by
(q0 ≈ 9.1, q1 ≈ 2.8, q2 ≈ 2.8, q3 ≈ 6.5, q4 ≈ 8.9).
Varying ω, we find a qualitative differences between the hier-
archical structures for large versus low ω’s, which illustrate the
fight between having large groups at the bottom to enhance pro-
ductivity and the cost of coordination: for smallω’s, the optimal
structure consists in having maximally fragmented hierarchical
structures with a maximum number of levels and smallest group
sizes (all qr’s are equal to the minimum size 2); for larger ω’s,
larger subgroups are favoured, especially at the bottom and top
levels, with relatively fewer levels (see Fig. 1 in the SI)
3. Optimal structures for geometrical hierarchies
3.1. Description of optimal structures
We now analyse the configurations of group sizes (q0, . . . , q∗p)
that maximise (6). For a hierarchy with some fixed p, we deter-
mine the configuration {q0, . . . , qp} iteratively, by solving equa-
tion ∂Π /∂Nr = 0, and verifying that the solution indeed corre-
sponds to a maximum. Details are found in the SI. There, we
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Figure 2: Production Π(p) as a function of p (number of hierarchical levels minus one) for four different sets of parameters for a total population of 212 = 4096
collaborators. For each of the four parameter set indicated in the four legends along the vertical axis, we obtain the optimal group sizes {q0, . . . , qp}, and calculate
the corresponding total production Π(p) from expression (6). The function Π(p) exhibits a maximum at some p = p∗ indicated with an open circle. For each of the
four optima, the corresponding optimal group sizes {q0, . . . , qp∗ } are given in the form of a stack of rectangles put on top of each other. The four different sets of
parameters span different regimes and thus hierarchical designs. Non-integer values of qr’s should be interpreted as a combination of group of integer numbers of
collaborators, with numbers within one unit from the quoted qr and such their average value is as close as possible to the qr . For instance, qr = 3.7 or 3.8 should be
interpreted as corresponding to three groups of 4 and one group of 3. See main text for a detailed description of the four different cases.
also double check that the optimal solution is not obtained by
splitting the N individuals into isolated sub-structures.
The optimal group sizes are found to obey the recursive rela-
tion
µr+1βq
β−1
r+1 + 2λr+1qr+1 = µr(β − 1)qβr − λrq2r − λr+1, (7)
in the presence of the constraints N =
∏p
r=0 qr and qr ∈
(2,N/2p). If solutions of (7) violates these constraints, one
has to consider solutions on the boundaries. We thus ap-
ply a sequential numerical optimisation. First, for each
p ∈ {0, 1, . . . , pmax}, we obtain numerically the configuration
{q0, . . . , qp} that maximises (6) (see SI for details), thus getting
the total production Π(p) as a function of p. Different examples
of this p-dependence are depicted in Fig. 2, Then, p∗ is deter-
mined as the value that maximises the total production Π(p)
given by (6). Fig. 2 presents the results of the search for the
optimal hierarchical structures for four different set of parame-
ters.
(a) Small group sizes and many hierarchical levels: An end-
member class of solutions consists in having the smallest
groups as possible, structured over as many levels as possible.
This corresponds to the hierarchical structure at the boundary of
the constraints qr ∈ (2,N/2p), namely qr = 2 at all levels r and
thus N = 2p+1. This occurs approximately (but not necessarily
precisely) when the output pre-factor ω is large compared to the
relative cost-productivity scaling factor η and groups at higher
levels are equally or more efficient than lower levels (κ > 1).
This generalises the results found for the military hierarchies,
whose structures are more simply controlled by the production
ω of the bottom level with an inverse dependence as a function
of ω, illustrating that hierarchical structures result from subtle
competition between the different ingredients ω, κ, η.
(b) Trade-off solutions with non-trivial group sizes at different
levels: When the output factor ωκr and cost factor ρr := (κη)r
are more balanced over multiple levels of the hierarchy, solu-
tions expressing a trade-off between output and cost are char-
acterised by non-trivial optimal group sizes at different levels
of the hierarchy. This is illustrated in Fig. 2 by the orange line
with filled triangles and the stack of orange rectangles giving
p∗ = 5 and the corresponding optimal group sizes.
(c) Decreasing production with hierarchical level: For produc-
tions that decay with level order (κ < 1), a small number of hi-
erarchical levels is preferred (p∗ = 3), which can, for instance,
be combined with group sizes that are increasing at higher or-
ders in the hierarchy (red line with filled squares in Fig. 2).
Small optimal values for p∗ are also found analytically for the
“military hierarchy”, which is an extreme case of decrease of
production with level order (see SI).
3.2. Dependence of hierarchical structure properties as a func-
tion of population size
For given productivity characteristics {β, ω, κ} and coordina-
tion cost properties {η} (or ρ) corresponding to case (b) above
with p∗ = 5 in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 shows the dependence of three
main features of the optimal hierarchical structure as a function
of the population size N. The optimal group ratios qr shown
in stacked bands of alternating colours of dark grey and pink
exhibit several interesting features. First, as N increases, the
optimal number p∗ of levels exhibit a series of transitions, from
p∗ = 0 to p∗ = 1 at N = 3, from p∗ = 1 to p∗ = 2 at N = 4, from
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Figure 3: For β = 1.5, κ = 1, ω = 6 and η = 2, we show the dependence as
a function of the total population number N (in logarithmic scale expressed in
powers of 2) of three variables characterising the optimal hierarchical organi-
sation determined and described in subsection 3.1: (i) total production Π (blue
dashed line); (ii) productivity per individual, pi ≡ Π/N (dotted orange line);
(iii) optimal group ratios qr shown in stacked bands of alternating colours of
dark grey and pink. The tick marks on the right y-axis show the sizes qr of the
groups for N = 214, for which the optimal structure is given by p∗ = 4 with
q0 ≈ 7, q1 ≈ 4, q2 ≈ 3, q3 ≈ 4, q4 ≈ 3 and q5 ≈ 3.
p∗ = 4 to p∗ = 5 at around N = 2020, and so forth. Note that
the range of population sizes for a given p∗ does not follow a
simple geometrical series that would be revealed by an approxi-
mately equi-spaced spacing in the logarithmic representation of
the x-axis in Fig. 3. In particular, the optimal value p∗ = 4 is
found over a very large interval 25 − 1 < N ≤ 211. Nonetheless,
p∗ can be shown to grow asymptotically on average proportion-
ally to ln N (see SI).
Each of the transitions in p∗ is mirrored by a break or spike
in the dependence of the productivity per individual, pi ≡ Π/N,
as a function of N. The first regime with p∗ = 0 corresponds
to a super-linear growth of production, until it saturates with
the emergence of the second hierarchical level, which is needed
to tame the growing cost of communications. In particular, pi
has its absolute maximum at N ≈ 15, suggesting an optimal
size of 15 for an independent organisation, which should be or-
ganised into q1 = 2 teams of q0 = 7 members. We stress that
these numbers are the optimal ones for the specific parameters
β = 1.5, κ = 1, ω = 6 and η = 2. Other parameters would
lead to different optimal hierarchies. Last, the productivity pi
can be seen to converge to pi∞ ≈ 10 for large N, corresponding
to an asymptotically linear increase of the total production Π as
a function of organisation size N. As pi∞ ≈ 10 > ω = 6, the
production per capita in the optimal hierarchical organisation
is approximately 67% larger than that of isolated individuals,
giving a significant gain. This asymptotic productivity per in-
dividual is however about 33% smaller than that of the optimal
population size N ≈ 15, exemplifying the relative disadvan-
tage of growing organisations even with its optimal hierarchical
structure. In a flat organisation, the quadratic cost would always
end up dominating the total production and lead to a collapse of
the organisation. Only a hierarchical structure can relieve from
the excruciating cost of coordination and harvest the superlin-
ear productivity (β > 1). The overall lesson is that knowledge
of production and cost properties should provide guidance to
shape the organisation structure for better productivity and per-
formance. This has implications, not only for growing organisa-
tions that should develop additional levels of hierarchy in stage,
as illustrated in Fig. 3 but also, for mergers and acquisitions.
3.3. When is the whole more than the sum of the parts?
As mentioned above and shown more systematically in the
SI, the total production Π∗(N) = pi(N)N of the optimal hierar-
chical organisation, for any fixed set of productivity and cost
parameters such that pi(N) > 0, scales asymptotically linearly
with the number of individuals N. In other words, the produc-
tivity or production per capita pi(N) converges to a constant pi∞
for large N, which is a function of β, ω, κ and η. On the other
hand, for N non-interacting individuals (i.e. for N “structures”
of q0 = 1 individual each), equation (6) reduces to a total pro-
duction ΠI(N) = ωN, i.e., N times the production ω of a typical
individual. In competitive, free markets, it will be rational for
people to come together and cooperate only if their per capita
production turns out to be larger than their individual ones.
Fig. 4 delineates the domain in the (κ, η)-plane, for different
sets of fixed values of (β, ω). The domain can be split into two
regimes, one for which pi∞ ≤ ω (regime where individuals are
better off producing on their own, called “autonomy”), and the
complementary domain for which pi∞ > ω (regime where indi-
viduals are better off forming a group, called “hierarchy”). The
curve separating the two domains is an increasing function of η
as a function of ω. Intuitively, the larger the individual produc-
tivity ω, the larger can be the relative cost-productivity scaling
factor η while still ensuring that a hierarchical society emerges.
The regime pi∞ < ω represents organisations whose goals are
not necessarily to improve productivity but to be stronger than
other polities as a whole. Indeed, for many societies engaged
in military competition for instance, what matters is the total
military power relative to its rivals, not per soldier efficiency.
Our theory on optimal hierarchical organisations applies there
as well, as we obtain non-trivial hierarchical organisations even
for cases where β 6 1. These solutions are mostly dominated
by a minimisation of the communication overhead. Elabora-
tions of this regime will be reported elsewhere.
4. Triadic hierarchies & optimal span of control
In section I-1.2, we suggested a derivation of Dunbar’s num-
ber ∼ 100 − 250, describing the maximum number of peo-
ple with whom one can develop stable social relationships.
But Dunbar’s number is actually just a part of the full story.
In 2005, Zhou et al.[8] discovered the general existence of a
discrete hierarchy of group sizes with a preferred scaling ra-
tio close to three: humans spontaneously form groups of pre-
ferred sizes organized in a geometrical series approximating
3−5, 9−15, 30−45, 90−140, 250−400 and so on. This finding
has been corroborated in many different contexts [9, 21, 23, 24]
as well as for various groups of animals [25]. These works
quantify the qualitative anthropological studies showing that
societies, from primates [23] to humans [26], tend to arrange
into discrete hierarchical structures, with group sizes ratios be-
tween hierarchical levels that typically range from 2 to 4 [8].
5
Figure 4: For fixed values of (β, ω) given in the inset, the domain below each
curve is such that the production per capita, pi∞, in the optimal hierarchical
structure is larger than the production ω of an isolated individual. The compu-
tation of the production per capita has been performed numerically for N = 214,
which is large enough that the productivity per individual has approximately
converged to its asympotic value pi∞. The background colouring shows pi∞ for
ω = 18, β = 1. The change of regime (white background) is where pi∞ = ω,
i.e. exactly where the hierarchical output Π is equal to the input of N individ-
uals, i.e. where Π(N) = ωN. For parameters (κ, η) above this line, it is more
productive if the N individuals work on their own. Below this line, hierarchical
organisation is preferred.
Within our framework embodied in equation (4), this observa-
tion finds a natural explanation, as we will now show.
As long as the coefficients in the sets {µr} and {λr} ensure that
a group (which has to be hierarchical) is more optimal than N
isolated individuals, the optimal number of hierarchical levels
p∗ scales as p∗ ∼ log2 N − 1 = n − 1, where we define N = 2n
for convenience (cf. SI). Since the maximum number of hierar-
chical levels is given by pmax = n − 1, which occurs when all
scaling ratios are equal to the minimum qr = 2, one can deduce
that p∗ = α · (n − 1) for some α ∈ (0, 1). So for example, in
Fig. 3, we see that the asymptotic regime (pi is constant) starts
roughly around N = 25, at the beginning of the p∗ = 4 layer.
The p∗ = 5 layer then only occurs at N = 211, such that we
estimate α ≈ (5 − 4)/((11 − 1) − (5 − 1)) ≈ 0.17. A more ro-
bust way to estimate α is outlined in the SI, and a systematic
classification of α as a function of different parameter configu-
rations, α = α(β, η, ω, κ), is depicted in Fig. 5 (a), showing that
α ranges from its the minimal value close to zero all the way up
to its maximum at one.
Assuming for simplicity that qr ≈ qs ∀r, s, it follows that
2n = N =
∏p∗
r=0 qr ≈ qp
∗+1 = qαn+1 and hence
q ≈ 2 1α+1/n . (8)
We can thus map the coefficient α to an optimal scaling ratio q
through (8). The optimal scaling ratio q is depicted in Fig. 5 (b)
for different sets of parameters, showing that q ∼ 2 − 4 holds
over a wide range of parameters. This is further exemplified in
5 (c), which plots the functional relation (8) for a large range of
values of both α and n.
However, there are other regimes where q deviates signifi-
cantly from the range 2− 4, and depends on the level within the
hierarchy. We propose that this range of parameters and corre-
sponding regimes explain the findings in Business Management
on the span-of-control [27–29], which is concerned with the
number of subordinates a supervisor can or should manage. In
many Fortune 500 organisation, the so-called “hourglass” or-
ganisation is observed, characterised by the vice-presidents at
the top presiding over 8 to 9 senior directors, each of the se-
nior director controlling 6 to 8 directors, each director super-
vising 3 to 6 lead managers, each lead manager directing 4 to
6 managers, each manager overseeing 5 to 7 supervisors, each
supervisor leading 8 to 14 employees [30]. Such a structure is
strongly reminiscent of the optimal hierarchy shown in Fig. 1
of the SI for the “military” organisation with β = 1.5, ρ = 0.5
for large production per individual (ω = 6 or 10). We thus find
that organisations, where the production is essentially done at
the bottom level and for which the other higher levels are only
present to optimise coordination and control, are characterised
by strong non-universal scaling ratios that are level-dependent,
with span-of-control ranging from 3 to 20. In contrast, as shown
above, when the production is more evenly contributed by all
levels, a quasi-universal scaling ratio in the range 2 − 4 ensures
the optimal functioning of the society.
In conclusion, we have shown that, with very few ingredients
captured in equation (6), a wide variety of hierarchically or-
dered complex organisational structures can be derived. Future
works will include pure integer optimisation, whereby we keep
the group sizes equal to integer values, while simultaneously al-
lowing for different group sizes on the same hierarchical level.
Our fractional group ratios qr can then be seen as averages over
these group sizes. Such an integer optimisation allows for direct
comparison with actual organizational structures. Other exten-
sions include allowing for heterogeneity among individuals in
the productive ability, complementarity and different communi-
cation and coordination cost functions.
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